Description:
Summary: Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS’s strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.
Details: HAMAS had its beginnings during the original Palestinian intifada in 1987 from elements of Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. The Muslim Brotherhood is a religious political organization with roots in Egypt dating back to the 1920s. HAMAS is fundamentalist Islamic organization which began primarily as a social services and political mobilization movement in the late 1980s and expanded to the West Bank as the Palestinian uprising continued for years.
Ironically, at the time, Yasser Arafat’s secular Palestine Liberation Organization was identified by the Israeli government as its greatest security threat, and initially supported HAMAS in an effort to weaken the PLO. Having been forced into exile, the PLO—though a potent political force internationally—soon was viewed as corrupt and detached from the average Palestinian. Israel has come to regret this maneuver since, according to its charter published in 1988, HAMAS rejects the right of Israel to exist and has since established a military wing which has launched traditional and suicide bombings periodically since the early 1990s. The PLO, on the other hand, eventually renounced the use of terrorism, reached the negotiating table with Israel, and has signed accords, etc., with Israel. However, by 1989, Israel determined the group to be a significant threat, banned the organization, and jailed HAMAS founder and leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin until 1997.
Though HAMAS and the PLO communicate, they hold little in common and are frequently at odds both on the ends and means of relations with Israel. Recent reports indicate that within the West Bank and Gaza, both HAMAS and the PLO receive consistent support from about 30% of the Palestinian population, while the remaining approximately 40% remain independent or support a much smaller party. However, as new public diplomacy statements and/or attacks occur, short-term opinion polls reveal rapid massive fluctuations in support for each.
The structure of HAMAS, though loosely tied and organized can be broken into four components: Da’wah – an infrastructure support network for recruitment, distribution of funds, social services, mosques, civic centers, etc.; Aman – the internal security unit tasked with surveillance, identification and elimination of collaborators, informants, spies, etc.; A-’Alam – propaganda and publications, and; an armed militant wing of many names including Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, Al-Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun (The Palestinian Holy Fighters), and others, utilized in terrorist operations.
Notwithstanding the many peaceful political activities and social infrastructure activities that it has created and supported since its inception, the goal of HAMAS to create an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel as outlined in its charter of 1988 remains firm and in effect. Its unambiguous support of the wave of suicide bombers in April 2002 demonstrates this clearly.
Activities:
HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks— including large-scale suicide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted Fatah rivals and began a practice of targeting suspected Palestinian collaborators, which continues. Increased operational activity in 2001 during the intifadah, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. Group has not targeted US interests and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories.
Methods of attacks and types of targets attacked
The initial wave of HAMAS attacks in the late 1980s generally targeted Palestinian moderates, HAMAS dissidents, and even rival PLO members. Mostly these were small-scale assassinations utilizing small arms or explosives in Gaza and the West Bank. In 1989, HAMAS began targeting the Israeli military kidnapping and killing two soldiers and continued sporadic stabbings and kidnappings through 1992.
By 1993, the range of targets expanded to include civilian Israeli targets inside Israel in reaction against the Oslo peace process between Israel and the PLO. The modus operandi of these attacks include target cafes, nightclubs, shopping malls, buses, and busy traffic intersections using increasingly more sophisticated and powerful explosives.
Though small scale bombings have continued fairly consistently, HAMAS has both ceased attacks for months at a time upon agreements with the PLO (e.g., December 2000 – early 2001), but also increased pressure by launching a wave of attacks (e.g., five bus bombings in Spring 1996, rash of suicide bombings in March-April 2002).
Location/Area of Operation:
Primarily the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. In August 1999, Jordanian authorities closed the group’s Political Bureau offices in Amman, arrested its leaders, and prohibited the group from operating on Jordanian territory. HAMAS leaders also present in other parts of the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
HAMAS is based in Gaza and the West Bank where it established its religious social services network and has secured a political base. However, it has located some recruiting and fundraising offices elsewhere in the Middle East such as Jordan (though expelled in 1999), Syria and Gulf states. Terrorist operations are generally limited to Israeli targets in Gaza and the West Bank, but attackers frequently cross into Israel.
Strength:
Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
Some estimates place the number of potential attackers close to 500, but there is general agreement that HAMAS has garnered thousands of supporters—as much as 30% of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
External Aid:
Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.
Affiliation with other terrorist groups and funding
Regarding affiliation with other terrorists groups, the HAMAS modus operandi parallels that of Islamic Jihad and thus tactical and logistical cooperation may exist between the two groups. Additionally, contacts most likely were made between HAMAS leaders and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP – GC (e.g., Sheikh Yassin’s release from prison was tied to a prisoner exchange involving the PFLP-GC), as well as HAMAS and Hizballah (Abu Marzuq diplomatic efforts with Iran in 1992).
For funding, HAMAS is supported by more fundamentalist elements of the Palestinian Diaspora through charities, fundraisers and benefactors, as well state support from Iran and some moderate Gulf states. However, since HAMAS was added to the U.S. Terrorism list, assets were frozen and charity-based fundraising in the U.S. and its allies has been greatly hampered.
Key Personalities:
Sheikh Ahmad Isma`il Yassin
Sheikh Yassin, the leader of HAMAS, is a soft-spoken, wheelchair-bound cleric based in Gaza. Born in 1936, he joined the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt-controlled Gaza in 1955. He was briefly jailed in 1966, but had been released by the Six-Day War in 1967 when Gaza fell under Israeli control. Over the next 20 years continued to join and/or found a number of organizations including Al-Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun in the early 1980. His covert efforts were discovered by Israeli authorities and in 1984 he was jailed on weapons charges. However, he was released in a prisoner exchange involving Ahmad Jibril's PFLP – GC in May 1985. By 1987 he had launched and led HAMAS as the military wing of the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood. He was jailed again by Israel in May 1989 but was released in 1997 whereupon he resumed his broad leadership responsibilities albeit in diminished health.
Musa Mohammed Abu Marzuq
Born in 1951, Abu Marzuq studied engineering in Egypt. Upon his return to Gaza, Abu Marzuq joined Sheikh Yassin in the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood until he located to the United States to study and eventually live and work. His close ties to Yassin propelled Abu Marzuq to co-found HAMAS and important leadership roles (e.g., head of the Political Bureau) despite the great distance. Abu Marzuq oversaw diplomatic efforts with foreign governments (e.g., Iran in 1992) and the PLO, as well as built up HAMAS’ military wing infrastructure and plotted terrorist campaigns (e.g., April 1994 bombings in Afula and Hadera). Following the Israel-Jordan peace agreement of 1995, Abu Marzuq was forced to close operations and soon after was arrested in the United States. He was extradited to Israel in 1996 and deported back to Jordan in 1997 where he resides as of Spring 2002.
Hussein Abayat
A HAMAS “Engineer” (bomb-maker) killed by Israeli forces November 9, 2000, as part of a campaign by troops to target intifada leaders.
Zaccaria Walid Akel
A senior HAMAS member in Gaza, Akel organized the first cells of the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Battalions in 1991.
Adnan al-Ghul
A HAMAS engineer responsible for the development of small missile, the Qassam-2, who was arrested by the Palestinian Authority on February 10, 2002.
Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
Based in Gaza, this physician is a senior HAMAS leader and current spokesman.
Muhyiddin al-Shareef
HAMAS “Engineer” (bomb-maker) killed in Fall 1998
Ahmad Awadallah
In late 1997, Awadallah was identified by the Israeli government as the next HAMAS “Engineer” (bomb-maker).
Yihya Ayyash
The original HAMAS “Engineer” (bomb-maker) was assassinated by Israel late in 1995.
Mahmoud Abu Hanoud
The Israeli government identified Abu Hanoud in the West Bank as a HAMAS senior commander. He was subsequently killed in an Israeli military operation in late 2001.
Khalid Meshal
Meshal is in charge of the HAMAS political bureau and has had offices in Gulf States and Syria.
Fouad Awad Tor'an
Tor’an, a local HAMAS leader in Al-Bireh and brother-in-law of the “Engineer” Awadallah, was arrested in December 1997.
Group Narrative:
Ideology: HAMAS has its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore shares concepts of transnational Islamic identity and “jihad”. However, though HAMAS proclaimed itself the "Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood" in its charter published in August 1988, it differs from the Muslim Brotherhood on both points. HAMAS is particularly nationalistic while the Muslim Brotherhood is universalistic. HAMAS calls for immediate jihad while the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to unify Muslims prior to entering a jihad to free Jerusalem. In short, the organizations differ on both goals and means.
The HAMAS Charter holds the authority of a religious proclamation and requires believers to first, free Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, but ultimately eliminate the state of Israel and re-establish a wholly Islamic Palestinian state on the same territory. This extremist position places HAMAS at odds with the PLO and Palestinian Authority, which have formally recognized Israel and entered into negotiations and agreements with Israel. For an useful English translation of the HAMAS charter, see “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement” translated and presented by The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm.
The group remains extremely active through fall 2002 including numerous suicide bombers.
Current threat level from group if in their area
Inasmuch as HAMAS suicide bombings express the frustration and rage of the general Palestinian population and the PLO leadership fails to deliver effective peace or effective conflict, HAMAS will continue to gather an increasing base of support, at least in the short term. However, its radical Islamist ideology is not shared by a majority of Palestinians, and HAMAS’ insistence on the complete destruction of Israel will not be achieved. These two factors ultimately limit the possible success the group might achieve.
The outlook, then, is for continued violent purges and assassinations within the group, and bombing campaigns (both conventional and suicide) targeting Israelis for the foreseeable future. The three events which might significantly reduce the bombing campaigns include: a new détente between the PLO and HAMAS; Palestinian-Israeli negotiations make great progress allowing moderate and secular Palestinians to withdraw support and swing away from HAMAS, or; overseas funding of HAMAS dries up. However, assuming the HAMAS leadership remains committed its Charter of 1988, total cessation of violent action is extremely unlikely.